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1. Introduction 
This study analyzes the empirical determinants of states’ decisions whether to limit the terms 
of their congressional delegations. The primary result is that congressional term limits are more 
likely to be adopted, and with greater strictness, in states whose delegations have less tenure and 
influence in Congress. Results also indicate that states’ choices on congressional term limits depend 
systematically on federal spending, voters’ access to direct democracy, and demographic variables 
from theoretical models of tenure and term limitation. 
These results offer clues for evaluating the political-economic determinants of a class of 
institutional reforms. Term limits are unlikely to be imposed on Congress in the future because the 
Supreme Court ruled in 1995 that state-imposed limits violate the qualifications clause of the 
Constitution.
1 However, similar to other proposals such as national recall, balanced budget 
amendment, and certain types of campaign restrictions, term limitation works to constrain the power 
of representatives. Moreover, when states limit congressional terms there are spillover effects on 
other states. This is because congressional term limits would alter the distribution of political power 
within Congress (Friedman and Wittman 1995), which in turn would alter the redistribution of wealth 
among the states (Dick and Lott 1993; Dixit and Londregan 1998). These results suggest the types of 
strategic motivations that would exist behind voter support for proposals that limit representative 
democracy, particularly where the change would alter states’ relative advantages in redistributive 
politics. 
Because congressional term limits are characterized by spillover effects as well as a tension 
between representative and direct democracy, there are natural implications for institutional 
                                                 
1 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). Barring a reversal on Thorton, amending the U.S. 
Constitution is the only remaining mechanism for limiting congressional terms. Bills failed in Congress in 1995 and 
1997, and a constitutional convention (as under Article V of the Constitution) is unlikely in the extreme. federalism. Throughout this paper, we invoke a common distinction between policy outcomes and 
political institutions. Variables such as environmental and fiscal policy are generally decided through 
legislative and bureaucratic representatives. In contrast, political institutions are generally decided by 
popular votes (i.e., initiatives and referenda to amend state constitutions). Unlike policy changes, 
which alter the incentives of economic agents, institutional changes alter the incentives of 
policymakers themselves (Landes and Posner 1975). A wealth of theory and evidence indicates that 
state officials strategically set policy variables. Game theoretic models of interjurisdictional 
competition delineate how states react to other states in setting policy (e.g., Wilson 1996; Wildasin 
1988). Empirical evidence reveals strategic policymaking with regard to environmental and fiscal 
policy. For example, List, Bulte, and Shogren (2002) provide evidence for free-riding among states 
in endangered species expenditures following Reagan-era devolution of environmental regulation. In 
addition, Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993) show that state budgets react systematically to spending in 
other similarly situated states. States are especially prone to strategic interaction on policies that have 
pronounced spillover effects.
2 Based on this work, many scholars have turned to studying the welfare 
implications of federalized versus centralized policy choice.
3
  In contrast, relatively little work has explored the merits of centralized versus decentralized 
institutional choice. The issue is increasingly relevant, as a wave of Supreme Court decisions have 
recently impacted states’ rights. Thorton centralized a mode of institutional choice that was important 
and popular among voters, thus strengthening representative democracy at the cost of direct 
democracy. In addition, a 1997 Supreme Court ruling struck down part of Louisiana’s unique open 
                                                 
2 As noted above, states free-ride on endangered species expenditures. In contrast, List and Gerking (2000) find no 
strategic interaction (no “race to the bottom”) in air-quality control, manufacturing pollution abatement, or certain 
chemical emissions. List, Bulte and Shogren (2002) note that these contrasting results suggest that strategic 
competition is more prevalent with environmental goods whose values have spillover effects into other states. 
Coates and Munger (1995) offer additional evidence in this regard, demonstrating strategic regional interaction 
among eight southern states in negotiating where to locate a toxic waste facility. 
3 Gordon (1983) presents a theory for states to “race to the bottom” in tax policy. In contrast, Oates and Schwab 
(1988) demonstrate conditions (e.g., more homogeneity of voters) under which decentralized policy leads to 
efficient allocations. Wilson (1996) outlines conditions under which environmental policy can race to the bottom or 
race to the top. Oates (1999) provides a review and discussion. 
  2primary system (which frequently resulted in congressional candidates being elected during October) 
explicitly to avoid adverse consequences of spillover effects.
4 Where states are free to select 
institutions, there are often no spillover effects: states can choose methods of judicial selection such 
as the merit plan (Hanssen 2002) and impose contribution limits and ballot access restrictions on 
state offices (Stratmann 2004), but states generally cannot impose similar restrictions on federal 
offices.
5 Term limitation offers the opportunity to examine how states evaluate political institutions 
in the presence of spillover effects, toward a richer perspective on institutional federalism. 
  These results also address an important gap in the large empirical literature on term 
limitation. The most fruitful area of this work is in specifying the consequences of term limits on a 
variety of political and economic variables. For example, state legislative term limits in the early 
1990s caused turnover rates to increase and average tenure to decrease, even before most legislators 
reached their limits, since many ran for higher office in anticipation of being forced out (Francis and 
Kenny 1997; Francis, Kenny, and Anderson 2000). Gubernatorial limits appear to reduce the 
incentive for politicians to maintain reputation, resulting in higher sales taxes, income taxes, and per-
capita spending while decreasing the minimum wage (Besley and Case 1995). Crain and Johnson 
(2004) echo these results for term limits on chief executives in OECD countries. In contrast, 
relatively little evidence exists to help understand the causes for term limits—i.e., the political-
economic conditions under which a polity will be likely to decide to limit the number of terms its 
representatives may serve.
6 Important exceptions are Friedman and Wittman (1995) and Donovan 
and Snipp (1996), which indicate that voter partisanship is a primary determinant of a district 
                                                 
4 Louisiana’s system, dating to 1978, declared candidates who won 50 percent of the votes in a contested primary 
the winner without a general election. The Court ruled that this conflicts with federal statutes establishing a uniform 
election day with the purpose of preventing earlier elections from influencing later voters. Love v Foster 522 U.S. 67 
(1997). 
5 However, states’ decisions on redistricting and apportionment are often superceded by the federal government’s 
interest in protecting racial equity under the Voting Rights Act (Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630, 1993). Crain (1999) and 
(2001) provides empirical evidence on the fiscal consequences and constitutionality of racial gerrymandering. 
6 Similarly, while most research on item-veto considers its effects, de Figueiredo (2003) empirically models the 
conditions under which states will adopt the item-veto; i.e., the choice of institution is the dependent variable. 
  3supporting state-legislative and presidential term limits. Yet no study has successfully specified the 
empirical determinants of states’ support for congressional term limits, which are distinguishable 
from limits on other offices in two regards. First, Senators and Representatives are the only type of 
elected office in the United States not subject to term limits. Second, compared to limits on local or 
state offices, congressional term limits are more likely to introduce spillover effects through the 
impact on redistributive politics. Hence, the results in this paper complement this sizeable literature 
with results on the causes for congressional term limits. 
 
2. Congressional Term Limits: Background and Previous Work 
An upsurge of populism in the early 1990s created a period of institutional change across the 
states.
7 Most visible among these changes were limits on congressional terms. Colorado voters were 
first, voting in 1990 to limit House and Senate members to three and two, respectively, consecutive 
terms in office. In 1992 fourteen states limited congressional terms, and another seven states 
followed suit in 1994. In April 1995 New Hampshire became the twenty-third and final state to pass 
congressional term limits. More states might have followed, but in May 1995 the Supreme Court 
ruled these laws unconstitutional. Thus, unlike other populist institutions that spread across the states 
over long periods of time (e.g., gubernatorial limits or citizen initiatives), congressional term limits 
occurred mostly during the 1992 and 1994 general elections. 
  Among the states there is a strong correspondence between the presence of direct democracy 
and the choice to limit congressional terms. For example, voters can use the citizen initiative in 24 
states, and 22 of those states voted to limit congressional terms (Illinois and Mississippi being the 
exceptions). Also, 21 of the 23 states passed congressional term limits via the citizen initiative (Utah 
and New Hampshire did so via state legislatures). Thus, direct democracy was the main institutional 
                                                 
7 Between 1990 and 1996, 21 states enacted state legislative limits. Nine states enacted stricter gubernatorial term 
limits in 1992 and 1994. Mississippi enacted a statewide initiative in 1992. 
  4vehicle for states passing term limits prior to their being ruled unconstitutional. 
The issue of term limitation continues to motivate a large literature, of which several studies 
empirically estimate voting support for term limits.
8 As noted, Friedman and Wittman (1995) and 
Donovan and Snipp (1996) find that partisanship was a primary determinant of a district supporting 
term limits; however, their studies focus on state-legislative and presidential limits. López (2002) 
estimates support for congressional limits, but focuses on how legislators voted when the issue was 
defeated in Congress. Tabarrok (1996), López (1996), and Clain and Mao (2003) all estimate support 
by voters for congressional term limits. However, Clain and Mao (2003) exclude direct democracy 
from the model and  Tabarrok’s (1996) sample excludes the last eight states that limited terms. 
Moreover, these previous attempts to specify state support for congressional term limits were 
plagued by endogeneity between term limits and voters’ access to direct democracy. There is a near 
one-to-one correspondence between states that passed term limits and states where voters can use the 
citizen initiative. Understandably, in previous results the direct democracy variable dominated 
explanatory power. This is troublesome because it leaves only the inference that a state would pass 
term limits simply if it had the initiative process, a conclusion at odds with a wealth of theoretical 
scholarship on term limitation. 
Our approach to this estimation problem is twofold. First, we recognize that states passed 
term limits laws of varying stringency: some states were strict, others lenient. So we quantify the 
decision on term limits as a multiple-category dependent variable, unlike previous studies that used a 
dichotomous coding. Second, we control for unobserved heterogeneity by estimating a two-stage 
model that instruments for direct democracy to control for upward bias in its coefficient estimate. 
The results from this model indicate that states’ choices on congressional term limits depend 
systematically on measures of relative influence in Congress—specifically tenure, leadership 
position, and federal spending by state—as well as other variables predicted by theoretical models of 
                                                 
8 López (2003) provides a survey of the term limits literature. 
  5tenure and term limitation. Direct democracy plays an important empirical role in our estimations, 
but does not dominate explanatory power. Our results are more supportive of theories of term limits, 
indicating that strategic interaction explains states’ decisions whether to limit congressional terms. 
 
3. Theory: Why States Would Unilaterally Choose  Congressional Term Limits 
Term limitation is an institutional mechanism that affects the tenure-turnover tradeoff facing 
voters when using the electoral mechanism—i.e., when choosing candidates for office. Voters benefit 
in certain ways from low turnover among elected officials. A state governor with considerable time 
in office has gained valuable job experience, has become adept as the ambassador of the state, and 
has familiarity to voters in times of crisis. A U.S. senator, as she accumulates tenure in office, can 
more effectively represent the state’s interests to Congress. With more experience, better committee 
assignments, and seniority (tenure relative to other senators) she can direct more benefits to the 
state—for example, greater transfers net of taxes. 
Voters can also be harmed by high tenure. The governor, senator, or other elected official 
with increasing tenure may accumulate skills at dissuading effective challengers, and use this 
electoral security to enrich their own and favored parochial interests. If political entry barriers 
become sufficiently high, voters may discover that removing their highly-tenured politicians is 
intractable; the incumbent advantage is too great, even in the face of poor job performance, shirking, 
scandal, or simply the presence of an attractive challenger. 
The optimal tenure of elected officials occurs where the marginal tenure cost equals the 
marginal turnover cost (Adams and Kenny 1986). Term limitation is a mechanism for approaching 
optimal tenure in polities that experience or anticipate excessive tenure costs. In 38 states, for 
example, voters have decided to impose some form of term limit on governors. Voters in these states 
implicitly volunteered for the costs of higher turnover in exchange for lower tenure costs. 
A similar type of voter calculus presumably underlies the unilateral decisions by 23 states to 
  6limit congressional terms. However, unlike gubernatorial or state-legislative limits, states’ decisions 
on congressional limits are interdependent, in that the tenure and turnover costs of one state depend 
systematically on the tenure and turnover costs in other states. Consider a state whose congressional 
delegation has accumulated relatively high average tenure. Members from this state hold leadership 
positions, rank high on valuable committees, and bargain strongly in logrolling. This delegation has a 
high degree of representative capital relative to members from other states. Consider instead a state 
with many junior members occupying the rank and file of the seniority system. This delegation has 
relatively low representative capital. States with relatively high representative capital are advantaged 
in acquiring net transfers. Thus, term limits would impose greater turnover costs on the state with 
relatively high representative capital. In short, voters face a strategic decision when considering 
optimal tenure and term limits for congressional office. 
Universal term limits—which would occur if all states agreed to limit, or if Congress term-
limited itself—may be welfare enhancing if tenure costs exceed the collective optimum for all states. 
In a transfer society, excessive tenure exacerbates the political shirking problem, the magnitude of 
government spending, and the associated deadweight losses created in the economy. By this 
reasoning, reducing average tenure in Congress would entail efficiency gains.
9 Voters could agree to 
keep tenure from becoming excessive. However, the election mechanism fails to enforce the 
agreement: voters are better off reelecting their own incumbent to protect relative tenure and free ride 
off voters who replace their delegation. Universal term limits are a means to solve the dilemma (Dick 
and Lott 1993). 
The free-rider explanation fits state-legislative term limits, which are universal. The 
extension to congressional term limits is less clear because states act unilaterally. When a state 
unilaterally limits the terms of its own representatives, it loses relative representative capital and net 
                                                 
9 The empirical evidence indicates at best a weak relationship between tenure and spending. See Sobel and Wagner 
(1998); Aka, Reed, Schansberg, and Zhu (1996); and Reed, Schansberg, Wilbanks, and Zhu (1998). On this basis, 
López (2003) critiques the efficiency argument for term limits. 
  7transfers. The decision is similar to choosing the low-payoff in an off-diagonal cell of a prisoners’ 
dilemma. Several possible explanations exist. Voters could have been signaling voters in other states 
their willingness to cooperate, perhaps engaging in Stackelberg leadership in hopes that other states 
would subsequently limit their delegations. The first movers were states where voters have access to 
direct democracy mechanisms (e.g., citizen initiative). When nearly all states with citizen initiative 
had passed term limits, the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional. Thorton halted what may 
have become a trend toward states without the initiative process choosing to limit terms: New 
Hampshire was the last state to limit congressional terms (just weeks prior to the Supreme Court 
ruling) and only one of two states to do so by a vote in the state legislature. Without observing which 
additional states would subsequently limit terms, the cooperative signaling explanation cannot be 
tested.
10
Other explanations present testable alternatives. First, risk-averse voters in states with highly 
diverse populations may benefit from term limits, not for the reduction in tenure, but for the 
increased frequency of open-seat elections (Glaeser 1997; Tabarrok 1994, 1996). A risk-averse group 
prefers being in power half the time to a one-half chance of never being in power. In more polarized 
states, a set of interests will experience greater disutility from any other set of interests being in 
power. Thus, groups in more diverse populations could be more likely to agree to limit their own 
terms, if only as a means to ensure that other groups are also limited.  
  Second, term limits may complement rational ignorance. Information costs about incumbents 
and candidates are approximately equal across the states, but voters’ incentives to gather information, 
or their ability to process a quantity of information toward rational choices, can vary with education 
levels. By this reasoning, a more educated electorate is less in need of a substitute for elections and, 
therefore, less likely to choose term limits (Adams and Kenny 1986). 
  Third, voters’ ideological or demographic characteristics may influence their preferences for 
                                                 
10 The empirical application below is used to predict by simulation which states would have passed term limits. 
  8congressional term limits. Since term limits were widely expected to bring about a smaller 
government, more conservative or populist electorates would have been more likely to pass term 
limits. Voter ideology may be measurable with roll call voting records of a state’s House members, 
or party identification such as presidential vote shares. 
Fourth, voters’ decisions on term limits may depend on extant transfers and representative 
capital. States with greater federal spending would have more to lose if term limits decrease the size 
of government. On the other hand, voters preferring limited government may perceive high rates of 
federal spending as indication of the deadweight loss associated with tenure costs. Measures of a 
state’s transfer portfolio could include highway spending, defense spending, and/or federal funds in 
general. Similarly, states with high relative representative capital have more to lose with term limits, 
particularly when unilaterally chosen. An electorate whose representatives have higher average 
tenure, or more leadership positions, should be less likely to pass term limits. 
Finally, direct democracy played a key institutional role The empirical application below 
treats the selection of term limits as a multi-category variable and controls statistically for the 
presence of initiative in a state. 
4. Empirical Model  
4.1. Citizen Initiative 
Since the citizen initiative (henceforth “CI”) played a key institutional role, it is necessary 
that the estimation of the determinants of TL includes this variable. However, including CI as an 
explanatory variable may introduce endogeneity bias into the estimation if CI (or another measure of 
direct democracy) is determined by many of the same factors that contribute to a state’s probability 
of having term limits.
11 As long as these factors are observable to the researcher, there will be no 
                                                 
11 Endogeneity bias can arise because of a number of specification issues such as sample selection, omitted 
variables, and unobserved heterogeneity. The source of bias in states’ choice of term limits is perhaps best conceived 
as arising from unobserved heterogeneity because we expect that unobservable measures that vary over sample units 
impact both the dependent variable and at least one of the independent variables, namely CI. 
  9estimation bias. However, if some of these factors are unobservable, then biases can arise. For 
example, assume the researcher wishes to run a simple regression of TL on the existence of CI by 
state. Also assume that another variable exists, e.g., “preference by the inhabitants of a state for 
public control of the state’s political institutions,” which has a positive effect on CI in that state and 
also has a positive impact on TL. If this factor is unobserved, then the coefficient on CI in this 
regression will be biased upward, since this coefficient will also capture the influence on TL of the 
unobserved factor. 
In fact, states adopted CI primarily through statewide popular votes (Matsusaka 2004). Since 
CI was determined by the same political mechanisms and social processes that shape TL, there is a 
theoretical basis for expecting CI and TL to be endogenously selected (Shvetsova 2003). Examining 
results in previous studies reveals also an empirical basis for endogeneity. Earlier work had difficulty 
calculating reliable estimates because the CI variable would swamp the effects of the other 
explanatory variables, leaving room only for the interpretation that states with direct democracy 
would be the states with congressional term limits. This conclusion disregards the theoretical 
motivations for term limits discussed earlier in this paper. We interpret the dominance of the CI 
variable as reported in other work as upward bias of its coefficient estimate. Our approach is to 
control for this endogeneity, allowing for more theoretically and empirically plausible findings based 
on unbiased estimates. To accomplish this, we need to construct a consistent estimate of CI that is 
purged of endogeneity bias for use as an explanatory variable in a regression of term limits on its 
determinants.  
One obvious approach to controlling for endogeneity bias is an instrumental-variables-type 
estimation. In such an approach, an instrument, correlated with CI but uncorrelated with the 
unobserved factor(s), is used in place of CI in the term limit regression. To obtain such an instrument 
for CI, we estimate the logistic regression model given in equation (1). 
  10 (1)   log [CIi0/CIi1] = γ0 + γiXi + θiZi + μi
The dependent variable is the log odds of state i having the citizen initiative versus not having it. γ0, 
the vector γi, and the vector θi are parameters to be estimated. Xi is a vector of independent variables, 
and the vector Zi represents the variables to be used as instruments. The components of Zi will also 
serve as exclusion restrictions to identify equation (1) from the term limit regression discussed 
below; these instruments/restrictions will be discussed in the next section.
12 The term μi represents 
the error term, containing all unobserved determinants of CI, and is assumed to have logistic 
distribution. Equation (1) is a reduced-form expression which can be used to generate predicted 
probabilities for CI. These predicted probabilities will be purged of endogeneity bias and can be used 
as exogenous regressors in the term limit regression. Specifically, the predicted value for CIi 
(denoted ĈIi) equals the predicted probability that state i will have term limits computed using the 
estimates from equation (1) and will be bounded by 0 and 1. 
4.2. Dependent Variable 
The most direct way to measure states’ choices on congressional term limits would be a 
binary variable coded 1 for states that passed term limits and zero otherwise. Such binary coding 
would ignore important variations in the stringency of the laws as passed. Nevada’s law, for 
example, was quite stringent, allowing just three House terms and two Senate terms for life. In 
contrast Utah’s law was relatively lax, allowing multiple stays of six consecutive terms in the House 
and two consecutive terms in the Senate, following a one-term absence from office. Previous 
estimates of states’ decisions on congressional term limits have used a binary dependent variable, 
ignoring variations in the stringency of the laws passed (López 1996; Tabarrok 1996; Clain and Mao 
2003). 
Table 1 lists the length and waiting period required under each state’s term limits law. The 
                                                 
12 Notice that equation (1) does not attempt to model the process by which a state adopts CI (an issue that is beyond 
the scope of this paper). The first stage merely attempts to obtain an instrument for the second stage. 
  11states naturally fall into three groups of approximately equal stringency. The most stringent group 
consists of lifetime term limits, typically of six and eight years in House and Senate, respectively. 
The moderate group lets individuals return to office after a waiting period roughly equal to the term 
allowed in office. Finally, the weak group allows more generous stays in office and lets individuals 
return to office after sitting out just one term. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
  This grouping suggests a multiple-category dependent variable, abbreviated TL, which is 
coded as follows: 
TL  =  3  for “strong term limits”  (n= 7); 
  =  2  for “moderate term limits”  (n = 8); 
  =  1  for “weak term limits”  (n = 8); 
  =  0  for “no term limits”  (n = 27). 
We estimate the determinants of TL in the following multinomial logit regression framework.
13  
  (2) log  [TLij/TLi0] = β0j + β1jĈIi + βijXi + εij
The dependent variable is the log odds that state i will choose term limit option j (j = 1, 2, and 3 
defined above) relative to no term limits. β0j, β1j, and the vector βij are parameters to be estimated and 
Xi is a vector of independent variables discussed in the next section. Note that the estimated 
coefficients will vary across term limit options. ĈIi is the predicted probability of state i having term 
limits generated by the results from equation (1) discussed above. The error terms, εij, represent the 
unobserved determinants of term limit choice and are assumed to independently and identically 
distributed as log Weibull. 
4.3. Specification 
                                                 
13 It may appear as though the appropriate estimator is ordered logit, which applies when all choosers believe that 
the higher categories of the dependent variable impart greater utility. This is not the case with the current variable 
since different states will order the categories of TL differently in value. That is, TL is ordinal in the stringency of 
term limits passed, but not ordinal in utility. 
  12Twenty-four states have adopted the citizen initiative: fourteen during the years 1898-1918; 
four more between 1959 and 1970; and one in 1992. The initiative’s origins are tied closely to the 
Populist and Progressive movements that began in the 1890s.
14 Yet there is little scholarly evidence 
on the empirical determinants of CI.
15 Using longitudinal data, Oakley (1994) estimates the 
probability of adoption, by state, in each biennium, from 1882 through 1990. Dynamically estimating 
the determinants of states adopting CI is beyond the scope of this study. Our interest is in generating 
a statistical instrument for CI. To that end, we select the Zi variables such that they are theoretically 
plausible determinants of CI but are not expected to affect a state’s decision on congressional term 
limits: 
•  STATESIZE, geographic area of state in square miles; 
•  SALARY, salary per annum of state representatives; and 
•  GOVERNOR, binary variable coded 1 for states with gubernatorial term limits. 
Voters in geographically larger states may have a stronger preference for CI due to greater costs of 
monitoring legislative activities. States with higher paid legislatures may feature more constitutional 
constraints on legislative power such as CI. Finally, states with gubernatorial term limits will likely 
consist of voters more in favor of CI. Note that these variables are independent from the strategic 
interaction of states in seeking net transfers from Congress. Thus, these variables can be used to 
estimate CI and are not expected to have an effect on TL. 
The exogenous Xj variables are chosen to measure the theoretical explanations for TL 
discussed earlier: voter heterogeneity; voter education; voter ideology; the strategic costs of term 
limits; and direct democracy. 
                                                 
14 In addition to citizen-initiated legislation and constitutional amendment, other reforms of the Populist and 
Progressive movements included women’s suffrage, secret ballots, direct election of U.S. senators, recall, and 
primary elections. 
15 Most research considers the fiscal impact of direct democracy; e.g., Matsusaka (2000), Feld and Matsusaka 
(2003), and Crain and Oakley (1995). Additional work focuses on voter competence and the influence of money on 
the vote outcomes in initiatives and referenda (e.g., Matsusaka 2004). 
  13•  POPDENSITY, a state’s 1992 population per square mile of land area; proxies voter 
heterogeneity. 
•  EDUCATION, percent of state population with college degree; proxies voter education. 
•  NOMINATE, mean of House members’ DW-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) scores 
by state; proxies voter ideology. 
•  PEROT, percent of presidential vote share going to H. Ross Perot in the 1992 election; 
proxies voter ideology and, since Perot voters were widely cited as favoring congressional 
term limits, also measures a stronger preference for TL. 
•  FEDERALFUNDS, federal spending per capita
16; the extent to which a state’s delegation 
brings in federal spending. 
•  TENURE, average tenure of House and Senate delegations to Congress; measures relative 
seniority held by a state’s delegation. 
•  LEADERS, index of leadership positions held by a state’s delegation; measures relative 
parliamentary power held by a state.
17 
•  ĈI, predicted values from equation (1). 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
Definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics for all variables appear in the Table 2. 
                                                 
16 This is a broad measure of federal spending. According to the Economics and Statistics Administration, which 
reports the data, FEDERALFUNDS “includes Federal Government expenditures for grants to state and local 
governments, salaries and wages [to federal employees], procurement, direct payments for individuals, and other 
programs for which data are available by state and outlying area.” 
17 In House, LEADERS = 0 + 1 for each committee chairman or ranking minority member; + 2 for a whip position; + 
3 for minority leader; + 4 for speaker or majority leader. In Senate, LEADERS = 0 + 1 for each committee chairman 
or ranking minority member; + 2 for a whip position; + 3 for minority leader; + 4 for majority leader. Notice that 
this construction of the variable restricts the relative values of the various types of leadership positions (e.g., a 
majority leader is valued at four times a committee chair). This assumption could be avoided by using separate 
variables measuring the number of each type of leadership position in a state’s delegation. However, due to small 
sample, we are limited by degrees of freedom in the model. Alternatively, we could simply count the number of 
leadership positions by delegation, thus imposing the opposite restriction that all leadership positions (majority 
leader, committee chair, etc.) are of equal value. What LEADERS really attempts to measure is the value of the 
state’s congressional delegation. Toward that objective, we instill some variation that approximates well known, if 
tacit, rankings of types of leadership positions. 
  14 
5. Results 
Table 3 presents the results from an estimate of equation (2).
18 Multinomial logit calculates a 
set of parameter estimates for each category of the dependent variable. Each coefficient estimate 
reports the effect of the independent variable on the log-odds that the dependent variable takes the 
value of the relevant category relative to the base category of 0 or “no term limits.”
19 POPDENS, for 
example, exerts a positive and statistically significant influence on TL falling in category 1; however, 
in categories 2 and 3 the effect is insignificant with negative sign. This suggests that observed voter 
heterogeneity contributes to a state selecting weak term limits, but that its influence diminishes for 
moderate and strong term limits. Similarly, the ideology of the electorate, as measured by 
NOMINATE, matters to weak and moderate but not to strong term limits. 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
Four variables explain a state’s selecting term limits of any stringency. EDUCATION is 
negative and significant in all categories, confirming Adams and Kenny’s (1986) prediction that 
more educated electorates have less need for term limits. PEROT is positive and significant for all 
categories, which is as expected given that Perot voters supported limits on congressional terms. 
TENURE is negative and significant for all categories, indicating that voters in states whose 
congressional delegations had high seniority were less likely to want any form of term limits. The 
                                                 
18 The first-stage results appear in Appendix A. The instrumental variables are jointly and individually significant. 
The pseudo-R
2 is a healthy 0.560 and the correlation coefficient between CI and ĈI is 0.796. As required for 
identification, the exclusion restrictions are jointly significant in the first-stage estimation of equation (1). Further 
evidence of the appropriateness of the exclusion restrictions involves the testing of over-identifying restrictions by 
comparing the estimates of equation (2) to estimates of a reduced-form version of equation (2) including all but one 
of the exclusion restrictions. Under the null hypothesis of valid exclusion restrictions, the two estimates of equation 
(2) will not be statistically different. Testing the null hypothesis involves a chi2-test on the additional variables. The 
chi
2-statistic is 2.84, and we cannot reject the null at any conventional level of significance. Thus, the exclusion 
restrictions have statistical support in addition to the theoretical support discussed above. 
19 The standard errors of the second-stage estimation should be corrected for the inclusion of a predicted value 
(instrument) as a regressor. We attempt this correction via bootstrapping. However, possibly due to the small sample 
size, the bootstrapped standard errors are extremely large (on average 100 times as large as those from the mlogit), 
resulting in no statistical significance in the model. As a consequence, we report the standard errors from the 
second-stage estimation; they should be viewed with this in mind. 
  15empirical role of TENURE supports the theory that states’ tenure and turnover costs are 
interdependent; i.e., that the decision whether to limit terms is strategic. This property is also 
reflected in the estimates on LEADERS: states with more leadership positions are less likely to want 
term limits, confirming the expectation that states protect their relative representative capital.  
In contrast, states with greater FEDERALFUNDS are more likely to pass weak or moderate 
term limits. This goes against the hypothesis that states protect the extent of wealth transfers being 
received, but instead indicates that voters wanting smaller government may view high government 
spending as indication of the deadweight loss associated with high tenure costs. FEDERALFUNDS is 
insignificant in category 3, however, indicating that voters’ willingness to constrain representatives 
goes as far as moderate but not as far as strong term limits. Lastly, the predicted values from the first-
stage logit are positive and significant for all categories. 
  Overall the estimation shows that direct democracy is important to the passage of term limits, 
but that CI is not the entire story to be told. Constructing the dependent variable as multi-categorical 
to capture variations in the stringency of term limits, plus controlling statistically for the presence of 
direct democracy, allows for more substantive findings to unfold. In particular, the results in Table 3 
highlight an awareness at the state level of the strategic costs of making institutional changes that 
affect policies and wealth transfers made at the national level. 
5.1. Simulations 
As with any nonlinear estimation, the multinomial logit coefficient estimates reported in 
Table 3 can indicate the direction of the effect, but they can tell us little about magnitude. To 
measure marginal effects of the independent variables, we could evaluate the impact of changes in 
the independent variables at the sample means. Alternatively, one could simulate changes in these 
variables for each state and then compute the aggregate effect on the entire sample. Simulating 
marginal effects is more appealing than measuring the effects at sample means because a simulation 
incorporates information on the entire distribution of outcomes instead of just the mean. To provide a 
  16clearer sense of the magnitude with which the Xj variables influence TL, Table 4 presents results 
from simulated ceteris paribus changes in each of the independent variables.  
  In the top section of Table 4, we report the mean “baseline” probabilities for each category of 
TL, as predicted by the results in Table 3.
20 The baseline probabilities are computed in the following 
manner. First, from the estimated coefficients presented in Table 3, we calculate the predicted 
probabilities that each state falls into each category of TL. Second, we take these predicted individual 
probabilities and compute a mean for the entire sample. To compute the simulated changes, we 
modify a particular explanatory variable and then recalculate the predicted probabilities of TL for 
each category and state. From the new predicted probabilities, we compute the new fifty-state mean 
for each category. In the middle section of Table 4, we report the predicted mean probabilities after 
simulating a 10 percent increase in each independent variable. In parentheses appears the change in 
the number of states in each category as compared to the baseline probabilities.  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
  For example, if POPDENSITY were to increase by 10 percent, the mean predicted probability 
that TL = 0 changes from 0.540 to 0.537. This translates as a decrease in the expected number of 
states with no term limits of 0.13.
21 This decrease is exactly offset by the combined expected changes 
to categories 1 (increase of 0.85 states), 2 (decrease of 0.47), and 3 (decrease of 0.25). Thus, if 
POPDENSITY increased by 10 percent, the model predicts some movement into category 1 (weak 
term limits) and away from all other categories. With the exception of NOMINATE, the magnitude of 
POPDENSITY is small relative to the other variables in the model. Consider EDUCATION, for 
example. A 10 percent increase would result in 7.7 more states predicted to choose category 0 (“no 
term limits”), with the largest change occurring in category 3 where only 3.27 states would remain 
with strong term limits. The other exogenous variables influence TL with similarly large magnitudes, 
                                                 
20 The predicted baseline probabilities for each state appear in Appendix B. 
21 Although actual changes in the number of states would have to take on discrete values, we report the changes to 
two decimal places to facilitate comparisons among variables. 
  17although some in different directions.  
  As a means of evaluating the effect of changing CI, we also simulate a 10 percent change in 
the ĈI instrument, even though a ceteris paribus change would only take place through a change in 
Zi. The results corroborate our earlier conclusion that CI is important empirically, but its marginal 
impact does not swamp that of the exogenous variables. 
The variables FEDERALFUNDS and TENURE are of special interest because of their policy 
relevance. By our 10 percent simulations, an increase in federal spending would result in fewer states 
expected to choose category 0; whereas more states would choose category 0 if there were an 
increase in congressional tenure. To complement the 10 percent simulations, we also simulate results 
at the actual 2002 values for FEDERALFUNDS and TENURE. These results are listed in the bottom 
section of Table 4. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that average real federal funds 
increased from $4.82 to $5.69 billion, and the tenure of the average delegation decreased from 22.36 
to 12.60 years. At these 2002 levels, the model predicts relatively large movements out of category 0. 
At 2002 values of FEDERALFUNDS, a predicted 7.9 additional states would have some form of term 
limits. Most of these would choose weak or moderate, indicating that voters are willing to constrain 
representatives but not as much as with “strong” term limits. At 2002 values of TENURE, an 
additional 10 states are predicted to limit terms, with most of these expected to choose strong term 
limits. Thus, given the changes in federal funds and congressional tenure in the decade since term 
limits began to spread across the states, the model predicts that even more states would have been 
expected to limit congressional terms had the Supreme Court not prevented them from doing so.
22
Our simulation procedure can also be used to suggest which specific states might have 
                                                 
22 It is possible that voters reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision by sorting politicians more frequently. 
Intuitively, if voters want greater turnover but are not allowed to achieve this through term limits, they will do so at 
the voting booth. If this is the case, then the Court’s decision would have partly determined the decrease in average 
congressional tenure, and the model would be picking up some of this in the simulated movements out of Category 
0. We cannot test for this potential endogeneity; however, it seems implausible given that the largest decrease in 
tenure occurred in the 1994 elections, which took place before the Court’s ruling. Nonetheless, the TENURE_2002 
simulations must be received with this in mind. 
  18chosen to limit terms. We cannot say with certainty that any individual state will fall in a particular 
category, but the simulations can give a clear picture of how the probabilities will change in response 
to given ceteris paribus changes. Table 5 presents the baseline and simulated probabilities for 
selected states valued at TENURE_2002 and FEDERALFUNDS_2002. The states are ranked by the 
magnitude of the change in probability of choosing TL = 0. Table 5 lists the top ten states most likely 
to switch from “no term limits” to limits of weak, moderate, or strong stringency.
23  
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
In the top panel are the simulated probabilities at TENURE_2002 values. West Virginia 
experiences the largest change in category 0: its predicted probability of choosing strong term limits 
(TL = 3) increases from 0.001 to 99.93 percent. Rhode Island has a much higher predicted probability 
of weak term limits (0 to 99.89 percent), and Texas now appears most likely to choose moderate 
limits (90.63 percent). Again, these results cannot tell us with certainty whether a state would choose 
term limits, or the stringency of the limits that would be chosen, but such large changes in predicted 
probability are noteworthy. Since Ohio already had weak limits, and is predicted by the simulations 
still to choose weak limits, this top panel of Table 5 lists the ten states most likely to enact term limits 
under the 2002 congressional tenure profile, ceteris paribus. Of these ten states, two would most 
likely choose weak limits (Rhode Island and Connecticut), one would most likely choose moderate 
(Texas), Kansas would likely choose moderate or strong, and the six others would likely choose 
strong. 
The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the simulations at FEDERALFUNDS_2002. These 
estimates reflect patterns similar to the tenure simulations. Alabama is likely to choose strong limits, 
Texas moderate, and Connecticut weak. Ohio is again likely to stay with weak limits. Notice that 
Missouri, which is not ranked in the top panel’s tenure simulations, has a higher predicted probability 
of choosing moderate rather than strong limits. Thus, this panel lists the eight states without term 
                                                 
23 Complete results for all 50 states are available on request of the authors. 
  19limits that would be most likely to enact term limits under 2002 federal spending patterns, ceteris 
paribus. Finally, notice that eight states appear in both the top and bottom panels of Table 5. Taken 
together, the TENURE_2002 and FEDERALFUNDS_2002 simulations suggest that these eight states 
would be the most likely to enact term limits as of 2002 were the Supreme Court decision not an 
inhibiting factor.
24
As a final note on the simulation results, consider the greater preference for term limits as 
average tenure declines. One point of view would suggest that this result is backwards. Specifically, 
if voters desire term limits because tenure is excessive, then the preference for term limits should 
weaken as tenure goes down. In other words, lower tenure should serve as a substitute for term 
limits. This view ignores the interdependence of states’ tenure and turnover costs. When a state loses 
tenure, its tenure costs decrease but it also faces decreased turnover costs of choosing to enact term 
limits. Empirically, the above results indicate that the decreased turnover costs dominate the lower 
tenure costs, such that the mean preference for term limits increases (as it does, according to our 
results, for most individual states). Lower average tenure may be a substitute for the desire to enact 
universal term limits. However, for unilateral decisions, our results underscore the strategic nature of 
states enacting congressional term limits. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using a multinomial approach to states’ choices on term limits, in a model that controls for 
endogeneity of direct democracy, this paper demonstrates empirical evidence that states interacted 
strategically in deciding whether to limit congressional terms. The Supreme Court decided in U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton that unilateral term limits are unconstitutional. Absent Thorton, our 
simulations suggest that approximately eight to ten additional states may have passed similar laws. 
                                                 
24 We calculated simulations at both TENURE_2002 and FEDERALFUNDS_2002 (Appendix C). We hesitate to 
infer too much from the simulation in Appendix C as it stretches the ceteris paribus conditions on which the 
simulated calculations rely. 
  20  These results suggest a natural extension to issues regarding institutional federalism. In 
particular, our findings suggest avenues for normative research on the welfare implications of 
centralized versus decentralized institutional choice. Some of these normative issues are framed by 
ongoing debates in states’ rights and institutional federalism. For example, federal law currently 
prohibits states from adopting certain political institutions that have spillover effects, but allows 
states to choose many institutions that do not affect other states. Recent theoretical work has shown 
that limiting the power of direct democracy within multiple jurisdictions can result in greater 
centralization of policy choice (Redoano and Scharf 2004), and the welfare effects of such policy 
centralization will depend on the intensity of voters’ preferences for constraining representatives 
(Caplan 2001). Our results provide some evidence on the intensity of such preferences, but invite a 
similar efficiency analysis of centralizing institutional choice. Moreover, de Figueiredo (2003) has 
demonstrated empirically that political factors as well as social efficiency motivate states’ selection 
of political institutions. Our results underscore that states will interact strategically in choosing 
institutions that influence redistributive politics. The welfare implications of term limits aside, what 
are the gains and losses of centralizing the authority to impose term limits? The question of strategic 
institutional choice among the U.S. States presents a fruitful continuation of this area of research. 
Our results also suggest the potential for strategic interaction among the states in reforming 
other institutions that have spillover effects, such as election reform, informed voter laws, national 
recall, and some types of gerrymandering. While the Court makes no reference in Thorton to 
interjurisdictional consequences, our evidence supports assigning a more prominent role to potential 
spillover effects in evaluating future state-level institutional reforms. 
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Table 1 











 Stringency  of
Term Limit 
Arkansas    3 terms  Lifetime   2 terms  Lifetime   Strong 
Oklahoma    3 terms  Lifetime   2 terms  Lifetime  Strong 
Oregon    3 terms  Lifetime   2 terms  Lifetime  Strong 
Nevada    3 terms  Lifetime   2 terms  Lifetime  Strong 
Missouri    4 terms  Lifetime   2 terms  Lifetime  Strong 
New Hampshire    3 terms  Lifetime   3 terms  Lifetime  Strong 
North Dakota    12 years  Lifetime   12 years  Lifetime  Strong 
               
Alaska    6 years  6 years    12 years  12 years   Moderate 
Montana    6 years  6 years    12 years  12 years  Moderate 
Wyoming    6 years  6 years    12 years  12 years  Moderate 
Idaho    6 years  5 years    12 years  11 years  Moderate 
Michigan    6 years  5 years    12 years  11 years  Moderate 
Washington    6 years  6 years    12 years  6 years   Moderate 
California    6 years  5 years    12 years  5 years   Moderate 
Maine    6 years  5 years    12 years  5 years   Moderate 
               
Arizona    3 terms  1 term    2 terms  1 term    Weak 
Colorado    3 terms  1 term    2 terms  1 term   Weak 
Nebraska    3 terms  1 term    2 terms  1 term   Weak 
Florida    4 terms  1 term    2 terms  1 term   Weak 
Massachusetts    4 terms  1 term    2 terms  1 term   Weak 
Ohio    4 terms  1 term    2 terms  1 term   Weak 
South Dakota    6 terms  1 term    2 terms  1 term   Weak 
Utah    6 terms  1 term    2 terms  1 term   Weak 
Note: All other states have no term limits. 
  25Table 2 
Variable Names, Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Name  Description (Source)  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
TL  Multi-category dependent variable  
(See Table 1 and discussion.) 
0.9 1.13  0  3 
CI  Binary coded 1 for citizen initiative 
(Council of State Governments 1995) 
0.48 0.51  0  1 
POPDENSITY  Thousands of persons per square mile, 1992 
(U.S. Census 1994, Table 27) 
169.8 236.9  1.1  1062 
EDUCATION  Percent population with any college degree, 1992 
(Barone and Ujifusa 1994) 
45.42 7.09  29  64 
NOMINATE  Mean of House members’ voting record, 1992 
(Poole and Rosenthal 1997) 
-3.82 19.81  -47.1 49.2 
PEROT  Percent of 1992 presidential vote to H. Ross Perot 
(Barone and Ujifusa 1994) 
20.54 5.69  9  32 
FEDERALFUNDS  Federal expenditures per capita, 1992, in thousands 
of 1992 dollars 
(U.S. Census 1994, Table 518) 
4.82 0.86  3.67 7.69 
FEDFUNDS_2002  Federal expenditures per capita, 2002, in thousands 
of 1992 dollars 
(U.S. Census 2003, Table 487) 
5.69 1.15  4.11 9.77 
TENURE  Mean years of tenure for House and Senate 
members, 1992 
(Barone and Ujifusa 1994) 
22.36 8.12  6  44.33 
TENURE_2002  Mean years of tenure for House and Senate 
members, 2002 
(Barone and Ujifusa 2004) 
12.6 4.53  5.71 28.67 
LEADERS  Index of leadership positions by delegation, 1992 
(authors’ calculations)  
10.38 5.95  1  30 
STATESIZE  Geographic area, thousands of square miles 
(U.S. Census 1994, Table 351) 
89.05 114.6  1.54  663.3 
SALARY  Annual salary to state legislators, 1992, in thousands 
of 1992 dollars 
(Council of State Governments 1995) 
21.42 14.64  0.1  57.5 
GOVERNOR  Binary coded 1 for gubernatorial term limits 
(Council of State Governments 1995) 
0.8 0.40  0  1 
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Second-Stage Multinomial Logit 
 




TL = 1 (weak term limits)     
POPDENSITY   .010*  .006 
EDUCATION  -1.18** .584 
NOMINATE   .17*  .089 
PEROT   2.42**  1.22 
FEDERALFUNDS   6.84*  3.59 
TENURE  -.97* .523 
LEADERS  -2.34** 1.15 
CI-Instrument   .71**  .333 
Constant  -18.02 15.6 
TL = 2 (moderate term limits)     
POPDENSITY  -.016 .021 
EDUCATION  -1.25** .616 
NOMINATE   .18*  .103 
PEROT   2.71**  1.24 
FEDERALFUNDS   7.57**  3.69 
TENURE  -1.05* .561 
LEADERS  -1.71* .998 
CI-Instrument   .77**  .354 
Constant  -33.23* 17.4 
TL = 3 (strong term limits)     
POPDENSITY  -.014 .016 
EDUCATION  -1.25** .601 
NOMINATE   .099  .075 
PEROT   2.30**  1.13 
FEDERALFUNDS   5.26  3.31 
TENURE  -1.00* .524 
LEADERS  -2.31** 1.12 
CI-Instrument   .64**  .329 
Constant   3.44  9.68 
Log likelihood  -21.18   
Chi-square (24)   77.07   
Prob > Chi-square   0.00   
Pseudo-R
2  0.64   
Notes: 
Dependent variable is TL where TL = 0 is the base (comparison) category.  
Sample is the 50 U.S. states.  
Explanatory variable CI-Instrument is predicted value from first-stage logit (Appendix A).  
See Table 2 for definitions and descriptive statistics of all variables. 
** Significant with 95% confidence. * Significant with 90% confidence. 
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Simulated Changes in Predicted Probabilities and Frequencies by Category of TL 
 
  









Predicted Probability  









       
       
  Simulated Probabilities for 10% Increase in Indep. Variable 
(change in number of states relative to base category) 








0.695 0.130 0.110  0.065  EDUCATION 
(+7.73) (-1.48) (-2.52)  (-3.73) 
0.547 0.154 0.160  0.140  NOMINATE 
(+0.34) (-0.31) (-0.01)  (-0.02) 
0.412 0.181 0.233  0.175  PEROT 
(-6.42) (+1.04) (+3.63) (+1.74) 
0.428 0.208 0.215  0.150  FEDERALFUNDS 
(-5.62) (+2.39) (+2.73) (+0.49) 
0.632 0.132 0.132  0.105  TENURE 
(+4.60) (-1.41) (-1.42)  (-1.77) 
0.642 0.106 0.150  0.102  LEADERS 
(+5.12) (-2.70) (-0.52)  (-1.89) 
0.426 0.189 0.225  0.161  CI-Instrument 
(-5.71) (+1.45) (+3.24) (+1.03) 
       
       
  Simulated Probabilities at 2002 Values 
(change in number of states in category) 








0.339 0.177 0.228  0.256  TENURE_2002 
(-10.03) (+0.84) (+3.39)  (+5.81) 
Notes: 
Baseline probabilities are derived from second-stage mlogit estimates in Table 3. 
Simulated probabilities are calculated for a 10 per cent increase, ceteris paribus, in the independent variable. 
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Baseline and Simulated Probabilities by State and Category for Selected States 
 
    
Simulated at TENURE_2002 
 
    0 1 2 3  Actual 
Rank State Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated TL 
1. W.  Virginia  .9995 .0001  .0000 .0007  .0000 .0000 .0005 .9993  0 
2. Rh.  Island  1  .0011 .0000 .9989 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000  0 
3. Alabama  .9772 .0038  .0002 .0077  .0000 .0000 .0226 .9885  0 
4. Mississippi  .9583 .0000  .0022 .0246  .0000 .0002 .0395 .9751  0 
5. Kansas  .8616 .0000  .0290 .0651  .0103 .2888 .0991 .6460  0 
6. Connecticut  .6646 .0019  .3353 .9980  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001  0 
7. Ohio  .6627 .0000  .2944 .7741  .0053 .0524 .0376 .1734  1 
8. Texas  .6549 .0012  .0055 .0089  .3000 .9063 .0397 .0836  0 
9. Minnesota  .6432 .0007  .0015 .0031  .0000 .0001 .3553 .9961  0 
10. Georgia  .9996 .3890  .0000 .0039  .0000 .0001 .0004 .6071  0 
11. Hawaii  .9060 .3283  .0259 .1707  .0000 .0000 .0680 .5008  0 
 
   Simulated at FEDERALFUNDS_2002    
    0 1 2 3  Actual 
Rank State Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated TL 
1. Alabama  .9772 .0412  .0002 .0747  .0000 .0007 .0226 .8841  0 
2. Mississippi  .9583 .0275  .0022 .2684  .0000 .0006 .0395 .7034  0 
3. Hawaii  .9060 .0268  .0259 .6230  .0000 .0003 .0680 .3502  0 
4. Kansas  .8616 .1041  .0290 .3216  .0103 .1856 .0991 .3886  0 
5. Connecticut  .6646 .0012  .3353 .9988  .0000 .0000 .0000 .0003  0 
6. Ohio  .6627 .0228  .2944 .9095  .0053 .0264 .0376 .0413  1 
7. Texas  .6549 .0341  .0055 .0114  .3000 .9194 .0397 .0351  0 
8. Minnesota  .6432 .1179  .0015 .0078  .0000 .0001 .3553 .8741  0 
9. Missouri  .3535 .0096  .0946 .1705  .2063 .5826 .3456 .2373  3 
10. W.  Virginia  .9995 .7354  .0000 .0028  .0000 .0001 .0005 .2617  0 
Notes:  
States are ranked by the magnitude of the change in predicted probability of choosing TL = 0—i.e., the change in 
probability of choosing no term limits. Complete rankings are available on request. 
An entry of .0000 indicates a probability less than 10
-7. 
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First-Stage Logit 
 




POPDENSITY  -.003 .003 
EDUCATION   .046  .097 
NOMINATE  -.028 .028 
PEROT   .356**  .159 
FEDERALFUNDS  -.162 .775 
TENURE  -.323** .138 
LEADERS  -.067 .129 
STATESIZE   .035***  .013 
SALARY   .139**  .065 
GOVERNOR   6.19**  2.55 
Constant -11.26  5.59 
Log likelihood  -15.22   
Chi-square (11)   38.80   
Prob > Chi-square   0.00   
Pseudo-R
2  0.56   
N   50   
Notes: 
Dependent variable is CI = 1 for states that have citizen initiative process.  
Sample is the 50 U.S. states.  
See Table 2 for definitions and descriptive statistics of all variables. 
***Significant with 99% confidence. ** Significant with 95% confidence. 
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Predicted Baseline Probabilities and Actual Category by State 
 
 Predicted  Probability  that  TL =   
State  0 1 2 3  Actual  TL = 
Alabama  0.9772 0.0002 0.0000 0.0226  0 
Alaska  0.0000 0.0423 0.9577 0.0000  2 
Arizona  0.0000 0.3416 0.6334 0.0250  1 
Arkansas  0.2461 0.0002 0.0000 0.7537  3 
California  0.2998 0.0001 0.7001 0.0000  2 
Colorado  0.0000 0.5664 0.3891 0.0446  1 
Connecticut  0.6646 0.3353 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Delaware  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Florida  0.0000 0.9035 0.0908 0.0057  1 
Georgia  0.9996 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004  0 
Hawaii  0.9060 0.0259 0.0000 0.0680  0 
Idaho  0.0000 0.5242 0.3925 0.0834  2 
Illinois  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Indiana  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Iowa  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Kansas  0.8616 0.0290 0.0103 0.0991  0 
Kentucky  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Louisiana  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Maine  0.0000 0.0419 0.9334 0.0247  2 
Maryland  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Massachusetts  0.2434 0.7566 0.0000 0.0000  1 
Michigan  0.0269 0.3773 0.3216 0.2742  2 
Minnesota  0.6432 0.0015 0.0000 0.3553  0 
Mississippi  0.9583 0.0022 0.0000 0.0395  0 
Missouri  0.3535 0.0946 0.2063 0.3456  3 
Montana  0.0000 0.1756 0.7777 0.0466  2 
Nebraska  0.0000 0.4390 0.0579 0.5031  1 
Nevada  0.0000 0.1861 0.3907 0.4232  3 
New Hampshire  0.2130 0.0244 0.0000 0.7626  3 
New Jersey  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
New Mexico  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
New York  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
North Carolina  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
North Dakota  0.0000 0.2879 0.0168 0.6953  3 
Ohio  0.6627 0.2944 0.0053 0.0376  1 
Oklahoma  0.0000 0.4765 0.1762 0.3474  3 
Oregon  0.0360 0.3195 0.0026 0.6420  3 
Pennsylvania  0.2552 0.3436 0.3823 0.0189  0 
Rhode Island  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
South Carolina  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
South Dakota  0.0000 0.0396 0.0032 0.9572  1 
Tennessee  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Texas  0.6549 0.0055 0.3000 0.0397  0 
Utah  0.0000 0.3533 0.6139 0.0328  1 
Vermont  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Virginia  1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0 
Washington  0.0000 0.3312 0.5161 0.1528  2 
West Virginia  0.9995 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005  0 
Wisconsin  0.9986 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014  0 
Wyoming  0.0000 0.6806 0.1222 0.1972  2 
Notes: Baseline predictions are from second-stage mlogit estimates (Table 3). An entry of .0000 means < 10
-7. 
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Baseline and Simulated Probabilities at TENURE_2002 and FEDERALFUNDS_2002 
 
  0 1 2 3  Actual  TL
  Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated Baseline Simulated  
Rhode  Island  1  0.0000 0.0000 1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0 
West  Virginia 0.9995  0.0000 0.0000 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005  0.9951  0 
Delaware  1  0.0163 0.0000 0.8323 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.1513  0 
Georgia  0.9996  0.0223 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004  0.9610  0 
Alabama  0.9772  0.0000 0.0002 0.0563 0.0000 0.0000 0.0226  0.9437  0 
Mississippi  0.9583  0.0000 0.0022 0.1469 0.0000 0.0023 0.0395  0.8508  0 
Vermont  1  0.0760 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.9231  0 
Hawaii  0.9060  0.0015 0.0259 0.6130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0680  0.3855  0 
Kansas  0.8616  0.0000 0.0290 0.0854 0.0103 0.6148 0.0991  0.2998  0 
New  Mexico  1  0.1522 0.0000 0.0694 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000  0.7770  0 
Notes: 
States are ranked by the magnitude of the change in predicted probability of choosing TL = 0—i.e., the change in 
probability of choosing no term limits. Complete rankings are available on request. 
An entry of .0000 indicates a probability less than 10
-7. 
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